Gаry Crocker: The island we knew about back from U2 photography in the beginning, and friends of mine went there and investigated the island. I did a debriefing of them when they came back. Uh, the island was, of course, suspect way before the defector came out. We'd known about that island, and we didn't know exactly, you know, the agents and that sort of thing. We never had a defector that came out and told us about the island. But we certainly, our analyst said that's what that island was used for; that it's for testing. And that... that information goes pretty far back, actually.
Gennadiy N. Lepeshkin: It was very closed and secret, and the people who went there to work, they were... carefully vetted. And access there for people who were not authorized, to that island... there was no chance of getting there.
Crocker: Hm. I take what's... what was interesting to me is that people with nothing but photographs made very good, sort of, engineering assessments of what happened there. And that proved to be very good, which I think is heartening. That we didn't have, for a long time, anyone who worked in these facilities. I mean they were very, you know, secret. It was very difficult to get information about what was going on in these facilities. And that's partly the reason we had a hard time selling the biological weapons threat, it's because a lot of people said oh, well how do you know, you know, that... well why don't... how do you... why do you think there's weaponization there? etc. You know, and questioning that. Because we didn't have what usually we want in intelligence, is you want to have some human source material, you want to have some electronic material, other things to put it together, and to come up with a definitive answer. And... but in retrospect, they did a great job. I mean, picking up what's going on.