Gary Crocker: September 1992, we sign an agreement. You've been forthcoming, we've been... everybody... you know, we've all done this, you've visited our facilities, we've visited yours, this is the end, you're not going to do BW, we're not going to do... So, everything's hunky dory, OK? Now, some of us think, gee, we didn't visit the military facilities. I mean this isn't really over, OK? What we heard from the policy people, and there's plenty of written literature about this period, is that Yeltsin is very, you know, it's shaky. You're forming a new democratic country. And policy people were more interested in supporting Yeltsin, supporting democracy, and not beating Yeltsin over the head that they're still doing biological weapons work. And that's probably a legitimate policy direction, it seems to me. Probably. But for us, who want to get the answer, we're still trying to get all the answers, we felt there was unfinished business. That we hadn't been to Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk, and these places. But you know, that's the way it is: the policy people had made a decision, and anything else would still be done quietly. And then along what I don't... you know, I really don't know, along comes Andy Weber in 1995, and he goes to Stepnogorsk, and more information comes from Voz Island, people have been there, and there's more what I call frosting on the cake. There's more information about the program, but nothing like 1989, you know, when the first defector comes out. There's just more information about a program that doesn't exist any more.
Andy Weber: The Honorable Andrew C. Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.