Richard Spetzler: In the Bio side, that was pretty well controlled by the Iraqi intelligence service, and the workers were told what it was felt they needed to know. And similarly, they were told in the... for the... at least the UNSCOM inspections, they were told what not to say, but not what to say. And that proved to be ultimately the weakness of their defense. Obscuring, you know, and I'll give you one example. You know, we were never supposed to accuse them of lying, because that would give them an excuse to, you know, rupture relations. But I couldn't take it any longer in December of '97, and I said to Dr. Taha... was the ostensive head of the... I said, "Dr. Taha, you know that we know you're lying, so why are you doing it?"
"Dr. Spertzel, it is not a lie when you are ordered to lie." And that was the approach that they were taking on the inspections.
Слава Паперно: И тот сказал, "Когда тебе приказали лгать, это уже не ложь.
Spertzel: And the... kind of the anticlimax to that, I said, "Then how are we supposed to know when you're telling us the truth?" She said, "Trust me."
Dr. Taha: Rihab Rashid Taha al-Azawi, AKA "Dr. Germ," head of the Iraqi biological weapons program under Saddam Hussein.